LIFE SETTLEMENT FUNDS: CURRENT VALUATION PRACTICES AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

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Abstract

We analyze the prevailing valuation practices in the life settlement industry based on a sample of 11 funds that cover a large portion of the current market. The most striking result is that a majority of asset managers seem to substantially overvalue their portfolios relative to the prices of comparable transactions that have recently been closed. Drawing on market-consistent estimates with regard to medical underwriting, it is possible to trace back the observed discrepancies to inadequately low model inputs for life expectancies and discount rates. The main consequences are a dissimilar treatment of investor groups in open-end funds structures as well as an unduly high compensation for managers and third parties. To address this predicament, we suggest defining life settlements as level 2 assets in the fair value hierarchy of IFRS 13, improving transparency and disclosure requirements, and developing new incentive-compatible fee schedules.
1. Introduction

Life insurance protects a policyholder’s dependents against possible financial hardship in case of his or her death. In 2011, the coverage in the United States was USD 19.2 trillion, an increase of 4% from 2010 (American Council of Life Insurers [ACLI], 2012). Due to its classical risk management function, life insurance has long not been considered as a financial asset. However, actuarial values are frequently positive while the policyholder is still alive (see, e.g., Doherty et al., 2004).¹ The shorter the life expectancy (LE) of a person, the more valuable the insurance policy, since its actuarial value converges to its face value (death benefit). Thus, a life insurance asset appreciates when the policyholder grows older.

Historically, life insurance policies have been classified as illiquid assets, since, in contrast to tradable securities such as common stocks, there was no active secondary market. Policyholders who were no longer in need of coverage therefore had only two options: lapsing the contract or selling it back to the insurance company for its predetermined surrender value (Kohli, 2006). In the latter case, insurance carriers were able to dictate prices within legal boundaries as they held monopsony power for the repurchase of their products. Nowadays, however, it is also possible to sell to third parties in transactions called life settlements (Kohli, 2006). Regardless of their comparatively short history, the life settlement asset class has managed to attract a lot of investor interest (Life Insurance International [LII], 2008). The main reason for this success is the independence of the underlying biometric risks from the broader financial markets that leads to low return correlations with traditional asset classes (see, e.g., Keating, 2009; Braun et al., 2012).

Considering the rapid evolution of the market for life settlements, it is not surprising that a number of investment funds focusing on this asset class have emerged over the last decade (see, e.g., Braun et al., 2012). In recent years, however, many funds have either struggled or failed altogether. Industry experts regularly attribute this circumstance to the difficulties involved in adequately valuing the funds’ portfolios. Owing to the unique character of each underlying life settlement asset, a mark-to-market approach cannot be applied and one needs to resort to mark-to-model techniques, implying that, in cases where the corresponding input parameters are not derived in a market-consistent way, the funds’ portfolio valuations may significantly differ from the observed price levels of current transactions. As a consequence, fund managers enjoy considerable leeway that they may exploit to the detriment of their investors. Although the valuation practices of the life settlement industry have already been discussed in earlier work (see Braun, 2012), a thorough empirical analysis in this context is lacking in the literature to date.

¹ The actuarial value of a policy is the discounted expected face value of its death benefit (see, e.g., Doherty et al., 2004). Since the death benefit payment is a contingent cash flow that may occur at different points in time with different probabilities, a set of mortality assumptions (i.e., a mortality table) is needed to estimate its expected value.
Instead, previous studies cover a broad range of other aspects concerning life settlements. Doherty and Singer (2002) as well as Doherty et al. (2004), for example, discuss the benefits and risks of a secondary market for life insurance policies. Gatzert (2010) provides an industry overview for the United Kingdom, Germany, and the US. In addition, more recent studies of market size and development have been undertaken by Conning (2011, 2012). While the impact of the secondary market on life insurers’ surrender profits is explored by Gatzert et al. (2009), Fang and Kung (2010) discuss the corresponding implications for consumer welfare. Moreover, Doherty and Singer (2003), Kohli (2006), Evans et al. (2009), and Casey and Lowe (2011) review regulatory and tax issues. Further topics that have been considered in the extant literature are the ethical aspects of life settlement investing (Quinn, 2008; Nurnberg and Lackey, 2010), the purchasing and due diligence process (Ingraham and Salani, 2004; Freeman, 2007), the challenges and opportunities from a life settlement provider’s viewpoint (Seitel, 2007), and the issues involved in securitization (Stone and Zissu, 2006; Ortiz et al., 2008). Similarly, some authors have examined the risk, return, and correlation characteristics of this asset class. Smith and Washington (2006), for example, consider the diversification process for life settlement portfolios, Dorr (2008) illustrates how they can be employed to extend the efficient frontier, and Bajo Davò et al. (2013) derive the optimal portfolio weight for this asset class in a classical Markowitz framework. Finally, Rosenfeld (2009) explores benefits and risks for institutions, Braun et al. (2012) measure the performance of open-end life settlement funds and comprehensively discuss associated risks, and Januário and Naik (2013) estimate expected returns based on a data set of US transactions.

Our contribution is a critical analysis of the valuation practices for life settlement fund portfolios that currently prevail in the industry. After a brief overview of the development and the state of the market as well as the typical transaction process, we revisit the probabilistic model for life settlement pricing and discuss its sensitivities with regard to different input factors. We then conduct a comparison of fund portfolio valuations with actual market prices based on survey responses, publicly available information from fund websites, and market data included in the May 2013 life settlement market review of AA-Partners Ltd. (AAP), a specialist firm based in Switzerland. Finally, we discuss potential reasons for value differences, point out the key implications, and suggest areas for improvement.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide some background information on the life settlement market and the probabilistic pricing model that forms the basis for the subsequent analyses. Section 3 is the empirical part, comprising the description of our data set, the comparative analysis of portfolio values, and the discussion of possible causes for deviations. Implications of our findings as well as suggestions for an
improvement of life settlement valuation practices are then discussed in Section 4. Lastly, in Section 5 we summarize our findings and present our conclusion.

2. US Senior Life Settlements

2.1 Historical Development and Current State of the Market

The life insurance sector in the United States comprises three segments. In the primary market individuals enter into contracts with insurance companies, in the secondary market policies are sold to third parties such as life settlement providers, and in the tertiary market trading takes place between investors (Siegert and Mick, 2012). Consistent with this categorization, life settlements are defined as transactions in which individuals sell their life insurance policies to third parties (Rosenfeld, 2009). The price paid by the buyer is generally higher than the surrender value, but lower than the death benefit. After the acquisition, the buyer is responsible for paying all future premiums to the insurance company and he or she collects the death benefit of the policy when the original policyholder dies. This means that, the shorter the insured's remaining life, the higher the return on the investment.

The secondary market for life insurance policies started in 1989 in response to the AIDS epidemic in the United States. People suffering from AIDS suddenly faced a need for cash to finance their medical treatment and to maintain their standard of life. One way to obtain money was to sell their life insurance policy to a third party for a lump sum. Due to the severely shortened LEs of these AIDS patients, the surrender values of the policies were much lower than the actuarial values and, in turn, the prices paid by investors (Doherty and Singer, 2003). Such transactions with policies of terminally ill individuals are commonly referred to as viatical settlements. During the 1990s, the viatical settlement market grew rapidly. According to Sippel and Buerger (2002), the value of policies that were viaticated increased from USD 50 million to USD 1.2 billion between 1990 and 1999. However, medical breakthroughs delivering better drugs led to a 60% decline in mortality rates of AIDS patients in the United States between 1996 and 2001 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2001). Hence, by the end of the 1990s the secondary market for life insurance policies was changing. While the viaticals industry experienced a constant decline, a new segment for life settlements emerged: senior citizens over the age of 65 with a LE of between two and twelve years (see Braun et al., 2012).

After a period of strong growth in the middle of the 2000s, the life settlement market began to decline again toward the end of the decade. The United States Government Accountability Office estimates that the face value of life insurance policies settled dropped from USD 12.95 billion in 2008 to USD 7.01 billion in 2009 (GAO, 2010). According to Conning (2009),
this downturn was caused by the financial crisis due to which a number of life settlement investors experienced problems in financing premiums. Other industry experts see the nature of the required investment as an impediment to growth. Life settlements investments tie up a significant amount of capital to pay annual premiums of 5 to 10% of face value, while it commonly takes at least three years before any policies mature and death benefits are paid out (Life Settlements Task Force, 2010). Despite the recent decline, a positive future development of the industry is not unlikely. In fact, for the first time since the crisis, signs of rehabilitated investor interest have been recognized (Conning, 2012). Moreover, the projected number of US citizens over 65 by 2050, the constant increase in new life insurance policies purchased over the last few years, and the growing costs of health care favor a further growth of the life settlement market (ACLI, 2012).

2.2 The Typical Transaction Process

A schematic illustration of a life settlement transaction is shown in Figure 1. The process starts with a policyholder who, for some reason, is interested in selling his or her contract. He or she may, for example, not be able to afford the premiums any more, require cash to finance medical treatment, or feel that the coverage for the beneficiaries is redundant (Kohli, 2006). Since most policyholders are unfamiliar with life settlements, their insurance agents are usually the ones initiating the transaction (Aspinwall et al., 2009). A broker stands in between the selling and the buying side. The broker's main role is to represent the policyholder's interests and to achieve a competitive price. Life settlement providers on the other hand represent investor interests and try to negotiate discounts (McNealy and Frith, 2006). For this purpose, they review policies based on factors such as the LE or the financial situation of the insurance company (Life Settlements Task Force, 2010). As different providers present their offers for the policies that are on the market, an auction-like environment arises and helps to establish fair prices (McNealy and Frith, 2006).

An important determinant of the price for a life insurance policy is the LE, which is estimated by specialized underwriters who analyze the policyholder's medical records and evaluate the corresponding mortality risk (Braun et al., 2012). After classifying the individual into a certain group based on risk factors (e.g., age, gender, health status), they come up with a multiplier (mortality rating) that is used to modify a certain standard mortality table (see A.M. Best, 2012). Methodologies for the derivation of multipliers as well as the mortality tables referenced differ between medical underwriters. This is a key stage in a life settlement

2 According to Blake and Harrison (2008), universal life insurance policies are the most frequently traded product in the secondary market. A reason for the attractiveness of universal life insurance policies for life settlements are their flexible premiums, which exhibit the option of paying at various times and in different amounts. In contrast, premiums in traditional whole life policies are paid periodically and remain constant over the life of the policy (Aspinwall et al., 2009).
transaction, as discrepancies in LE estimations imply different prices for life settlements and therefore have an impact on fund returns (A.M. Best, 2012).

Figure 1: The Life Settlement Transaction Process

Investments in life settlements can be conducted directly or through specialized funds, among which the open-end format seems to have prevailed. Life settlement funds are a convenient way for investors to gain access to this asset class, since they provide professional expertise for the construction and management of a diversified portfolio. Due to the complexities associated with the transaction process, a variety of third parties are typically involved in the fund’s activities (Ernst & Young, 2012a). First of all, a custodian is responsible for the safekeeping and administration of the assets. In addition, some funds rely on a valuation agent with in-depth actuarial know-how to estimate policy prices and determine their net asset values (NAV). There may also be an investment adviser supporting the portfolio management process and the selection of suitable life insurance policies. Auditors evaluate the fund’s financial statements and write annual reports, whereas legal advisers assist the fund manager with regard to transaction documentation and contract design. Finally, the servicer provides a variety of supporting services such as ordering medical records and LE estimations from medical underwriters as well as ensuring regular premium payments by providing custodians with disbursement instructions. Additionally, he stays in contact with the insurance carriers to verify the life/death status of the insured individuals.

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Braun et al. (2012) characterize open-end life settlement funds as follows: they are perpetual, offer ongoing subscriptions and redemptions, permit active trading, tend to reinvest cash returning from maturing policies, and exhibit a fee structure that is similar to hedge funds. Furthermore, they are mostly domiciled in offshore financial centres and therefore subject to rather lenient regulations.
and collects death benefits when they are due (Braun et al., 2012). Taking these considerations into account, it is clear that life settlement investments are associated with considerable transaction costs for investors.

2.3 Relevant Accounting Guidelines

In line with the rapid growth of the industry, the importance of appropriate accounting standards for life settlements has increased throughout the last decade. In the early days of the market, life settlement investments were reported at cash surrender value (CSV). The main problem of this method is that the CSVs of most policies tend to be very small and therefore the investor has to incur a substantial up-front expense (Life Settlement Industry Guidelines Group [LSIGG], 2006). The release of the 2006 FSP Technical Bulletin 85-4-1, Accounting for Life Settlement Contracts by Third-Party Investors, resolved this issue by offering a choice between the investment and the fair value method, subsequently established in the FASB Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 325-30, Investments in Insurance Contracts (Soomro and Zass, 2012). Under both approaches, initial measurement is based on the purchase price plus direct transaction costs. The investment method provides for further valuation by capitalizing any continuing payments, such as policy premiums. Gains, on the other hand, are only recognized when the insured dies or the policy is resold, and are measured by the difference between the carrying amount of a contract and the death benefit payment or sales proceeds. If new information indicates that the projected policy payoff will not be sufficient to cover the carrying amount plus expected undiscounted future premiums, an impairment loss has to be recognized (Braun et al., 2012). Ongoing valuation under the fair value method, in contrast, requires policies to be reported in a market-consistent way, thereby impacting periodic earnings (FASB, 2006).

A few years later, the FASB issued a new exposure draft containing proposed accounting standard updates that effectively abandoned the investment method (see FASB, 2010). Today, the fair value measurement of life settlement assets is governed by FASB ASC 820-10 and IFRS 13. These standards comprise a three-level hierarchy that reflects the level of judgment involved in the determination of fair asset values, which ultimately depends on the availability of reliable inputs for the corresponding valuation techniques (Ernst & Young, 2012b; IAS Plus, 2013):

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4 The CSV is the amount that the owner receives when a life insurance policy is terminated before its maturity. It is defined as the policyholder reserve less any outstanding premium loans and surrender fees.

5 Board Comment 40 in the exposure draft FASB (2010) reads: “The Board decided that life settlement contracts should be included in the scope of the proposed guidance. The Board observed that requiring fair value measurement would, in effect, eliminate the option to use the investment method described in Subtopic 325-30”.

6 FASB ASC 820 was updated by ASU 2011-04 in May 2011. ASU 2011-04 amends and explains how principles in ASC 820 should be applied (Ernst & Young, 2012b). IFRS 13 became effective for periods beginning on or after January 1, 2013 (Ernst & Young, 2012b).
• Level 1: quoted prices for identical assets and liabilities in active markets
• Level 2: inputs other than quoted market prices that are directly or indirectly observable
• Level 3: unobservable inputs

Since the fair value of life settlements is based on unobservable quantities, such as the survival probabilities of the insured, these products are currently classified as level 3 assets (Mazonas et al., 2010). Nevertheless, inputs must reflect assumptions that rational market participants would use when pricing assets, and companies are required to disclose level 3 fair value measurements in detail (Ernst & Young, 2012b).

2.4 Valuation of Life Settlement Assets

Since each policy differs with regard to the insured life, it is not possible to observe market values for individual life settlements on a regular basis. It is therefore necessary to resort to pricing models that rely on certain assumptions. As in the case of any other financial asset, the price of a life insurance policy equals the sum of its discounted expected future cash flows. Three ways to determine the net present value (NPV) have emerged in practice (Zollars et al., 2003). Firstly, the essentially obsolete deterministic approach assumes that death occurs exactly at the end of the LE (Bayston et al., 2010). A probability-weighting of cash flows does not take place. While being straightforward to understand and implement, this basic model does not take into account variation around the LE. As a corollary, it may significantly misestimate the value of a life settlement contract and is thus not appropriate for fair value measurement (Soomro and Zass, 2012). Secondly, there is the stochastic approach, which centers around a Monte Carlo simulation of the insured’s remaining lifetime (LSIGG, 2006). For each simulated trajectory, the future cash flows of a contract as well as their present value can be determined analogously to the deterministic method. The price is then obtained by calculating the expected value of the resulting NPV distribution. Thirdly, the probabilistic or actuarial approach was developed to overcome the weaknesses of the deterministic method and represents the current market convention. Instead of assuming a fixed time of death, this method relies on a mortality table that matches the insured’s age, gender, and health status (Lubovich et al., 2008). The probabilistic pricing model can be expressed as follows:

$$P_0 = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{tp_x \cdot q_{x+t} \cdot DB}{(1+r)^{t+1}} - \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{tp_x \cdot \pi_t}{(1+r)^t}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

7 The deterministic pricing model has its origins in the viatical industry, where LEs were much shorter and better predictable.
where \( P_0 \) is the price of the life insurance policy, \( DB \) equals the death benefit, \( \pi_t \) represents the premium payable at time \( t \), \( r \) denotes the applicable discount rate, \( p_{x \cdot t} \) stands for the probability of an \( x \)-year old individual living for another \( t \) years, and \( q_{x+t} \) is the probability that an individual aged \( x + t \) years dies within one year (one year mortality rate at age \( x + t \)). Accordingly, \( p_{x \cdot t} \cdot q_{x+t} \) equals the probability of an \( x \)-year old surviving for \( t \) years and then dying within one year (i.e., at the age of \( x + t \)). Since the death benefit is typically paid at the end of the year, it is discounted over \( t + 1 \) instead of \( t \) periods.

There are essentially three main model inputs: the premium schedule, the discount rate, and the mortality rates associated with a designated LE. In the case of universal life insurance, which provides for flexible premium payments, investors may choose to optimize cash outflows after the acquisition of the policy. The resulting schedule will frequently be based on a considerable degree of discretion and can hardly be derived from comparable transactions. In contrast, it is indeed possible to obtain market-consistent inputs in the sense of the fair value hierarchy for the LE and the discount rate as a measure for the risk premium. Both factors can be updated on a regular basis, taking into account changes in the market environment. In fact, if these input factors are chosen carefully, the resulting life settlement valuations closely reflect current price levels.

It is vital to note that market values for the LE and the discount rate cannot be considered independent of each other. In fact, when analyzing current life settlement transactions at closing, one needs to begin with the projected premium schedule and the LE estimate or rather the mortality and survival rates on which the counterparties have agreed. Once these inputs and the actual purchase price have been obtained, an internal rate of return (IRR) may be backed out of the probabilistic model and subsequently used as a discount rate for comparable deals. Hence, a market-implied IRR for the valuation of a life settlement asset is only valid and meaningful if, at the same time, the model is fed with the corresponding mortality rates.

### 2.5 Book-to-Face Value and Actual-to-Expected Ratio

To ensure comparability, we will express the life settlement fund valuations and current market levels based on relative figures, i.e., in percent of face value:

\[
V = \frac{\text{Book Value of the Policies}}{\text{Face Value of the Policies}} \cdot 100
\]  

Furthermore, the portfolio LE reported by the funds will be benchmarked with the actual medical underwriting that was brought to bear in recent transactions. For this purpose, we rely on the average of the LE estimates per age group as provided for each deal by the two
largest US medical underwriters, 21st Services and AVS. Similarly, the average of the LE figures per age group that were ultimately used to close the deals will be considered. A more detailed description of the data that enters our analysis follows in the next section.

In addition, we aim to perform an exemplary accuracy check with regard to the LE information provided by one of the funds using the actual-to-expected ratio (A/E ratio):  

\[
A/E \text{ ratio} = \frac{\text{Actual Death Benefit Payments}}{\text{Expected Death Benefit Payments}} \quad (3)
\]

An A/E measure above (or below) one, however, indicates that more (or less) death benefit proceeds than expected have been received during the time period under consideration. Clearly, if actual mortality experience is in line with expectations, the A/E ratio equals one.

3. Empirical Analysis

3.1 Data and Sample Selection

Market data for our analysis was obtained from the AAP Life Settlement Market Review, which is released on a monthly basis by AAP, a Zurich-based boutique company specializing in life settlements. AAP maintains a large network with life settlement providers, distribution agents, and asset managers, enabling the company to collect data for recently closed US life settlement transactions directly from market participants. Their goal is to provide “investors and other interested parties with actual, independent and unbiased information with regard to the secondary market for traded US life insurance policies” (AAP, 2013c).

The data collection and verification procedure that forms the basis for the AAP Life Settlement Market Review is depicted in Figure 2 (AAP, 2013b). Each month, US life settlement providers as well as tertiary market participants such as asset managers, banks, or hedge funds report predefined and standardized information with regard to all completed transactions to an external auditor. In exchange for their participation in the process, these data providers gain access to special analyses and reports offered by AAP. More importantly, however, they are known to promote transparency and integrity in the life settlement market and thus benefit from valuable reputation effects. After having received the transaction information, the external auditor tests for consistency between the different sources, anonymizes the figures, and then sends them to AAP (AAP, 2013b). In a further step, AAP delivers the data to an independent third party that computes market-implied IRR figures based

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8 There are in fact two versions of the A/E ratio, one being based on the actual and expected number of deaths and the other one relying on the actual and expected number of death benefit payments over a certain time period. We draw on the latter as it focuses on cash flows and is thus more intuitive for investors.
on a predefined transparent set of assumptions. Each stage in the production of the life settlement market review follows strict guidelines and is overseen by an independent advisory board (AAP, 2013c).

The benchmark figures used in this study have been obtained from the May 2013 release of the AAP Life Settlement Market Review, which is based on all secondary and tertiary market transactions that were reported between January 2011 and April 2013. Together, the respective life settlements represent about USD 1.56 billion in face value. From this amount, 19.7% were excluded by AAP because they did not qualify for the report. 93.7% or USD 1.174 billion in face value of the remaining volume are related to the main life settlement market, i.e., policies of insured individuals between 71 and 90 years of age, on which our analysis will focus. For these transactions, we have the average prices net of CSV (and in percent of face value) in the aforementioned 28-month period, broken down into two-year age brackets. In addition, the report supplies this kind of pricing data in combination with LE estimates and their corresponding market-implied IRRs for the shorter 12-

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9 The associated cash flows can be simulated through a dummy trade that reflects a generic policy (AAP, 2013a).
10 The guidelines as well as the members of the board are publicly available on the home page of AAP under http://www.aap-partners.ch/aap-ls-market-review/adv-board-and-guidelines/
11 Note that, from discussions with the industry experts that collate the AAP Life Settlement Market Review we know that stranger-originated life insurance policies, which represented a common problem in the life settlement market several years ago, do no longer play a noteworthy role in today’s environment.
month period from May 2012 to April 2013. Three different LEs are available for each traded policy: an estimate from 21st Services, an estimate from AVS, and the LE figure that the counterparties ultimately agreed upon when closing the respective life settlement deal.

The information in the May 2013 release of the AAP life settlement market review has been reported by Abacus Settlements, Berkshire Settlements, Institutional Life Services, Life Equity, The Lifeline Program, LifeTrust LLC, Magna Life Settlements/Vida Capital, Q Capital Strategies, Settlement Group, as well as a number of transparent asset management companies. All but two of the aforementioned life settlement providers are ranked among the industry’s top 15 as recently published in the media based on official information from U.S. regulators (see, The Deal LLC, 2013). Therefore, it is safe to state that our sample conveys a comprehensive snapshot of the price levels and medical underwriting practices that currently prevail in the U.S. life settlement market.

**Table 1: Life Settlement Funds in the Sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Domicile</th>
<th>Information from</th>
<th>As at</th>
<th>Model</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>April 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>Fund Management</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>probabilistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>Fund Management</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>probabilistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td>Fund Management</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>probabilistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Fund Management</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>probabilistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Guernsey</td>
<td>Fund Management</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>deterministic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Website</td>
<td>December 2012</td>
<td>probabilistic</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>Website</td>
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<td>probabilistic</td>
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<td>December 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
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<td>March 2012</td>
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**Table 2: Descriptive Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund Information</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inception Date</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAV (in Million US Dollars)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1,026.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book Value (in Million US Dollars)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>932.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face Value (in Million US Dollars)</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1355.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Policies</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age (Years)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average LE (Months)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to the benchmark figures, a critical prerequisite for our analysis was the sourcing of meaningful information about life settlement funds. For this purpose, 11 asset management companies were contacted by mail and asked to participate in the study.\(^\text{12}\) The complete list of survey items can be found in the Appendix. Since we guaranteed the respondents’ anonymity, recognizable information such as inception date, face value, fund volume, or cash amount will only be presented selectively. A total of eight funds collaborated, six of which provided the requested information directly while the other two referred to their websites. One company, Ress Capital Fund Management S.A. located in Luxembourg, even wanted its data to be explicitly identified, as it is aiming to build trust and offer complete transparency for investors.\(^\text{13}\) The missing data for the three funds that refused to answer our inquiry was procured from their websites as well as publicly available documents. In total, the face value of the portfolios amounts to approximately USD 5 billion. Against the background that Conning (2012) estimated a secondary market transaction volume of only USD 1.2 billion in face value for 2011, it may be concluded that our sample represents a substantial part of the industry.

Tables 1 and 2 provide some additional information and descriptive statistics with regard to our sample. The oldest and the youngest fund were launched in 2003 and early 2012, respectively. Moreover, book (face) values range from around USD 2 (11) to USD 933 (1,355) million, the average LEs vary between 20 and 127 months, and the average ages lie between 77 and 86 years. Eight of the funds apply the probabilistic valuation approach, one still relies on the deterministic method (Fund 6), and another one (Fund 11) did not disclose the type of its model. We also collected information on the number of policies, the gender split, and the amount of cash held. The aggregate book value of the policies was either provided directly by the funds or estimated by subtracting the cash in a portfolio from the NAV. Finally, whenever available, the survey data was complemented with estimates of the discount rates that are applied by the funds.

3.3 Comparison of Fund Portfolio Valuations with Market Price Levels

In Figure 3 we have plotted the life settlement fund valuations (net of CSV) in percent of face values (primary vertical axis) against the average age of the insured lives in the respective portfolios along two-year age brackets (horizontal axis). Each fund is marked by a red dot. Fund 3, for instance, reports an average age of 83 to 84 years and a portfolio valuation of 45%, implying a book value of 45 cents per US dollar of face value. Moreover, the graph shows the average price levels (net of CSV) in percent of face value of recently

\(^{12}\) Due to the rather short history of the life settlement asset class, the number of asset managers in the industry is still quite small. Accordingly, the 11 funds included in the analysis represent a sufficiently large portion of the overall market.

\(^{13}\) For more information about Ress Uncorrelated Assets Fund see http://www.resscapital.com/
closed transactions (secondary vertical axis) in the same age brackets. The blue bars represent secondary and tertiary market trades that occurred within the time period from January 2011 to April 2013, and the green bars are exclusively related to secondary market activity between May 2012 and April 2013. In the two categories under 75 years, policies were on average transferred for 8.6 and 9.8 cents per US dollar of face value. Beyond this tail segment, we initially see somewhat lower prices which then constantly increase with the age bracket, reaching a maximum at around 30% of face value for policies of insured individuals that are 89 or 90 years old.

Since every life settlement portfolio is unique and may differ from the policy mix currently traded in the market, these average price levels are of course approximations. In addition, it should be taken into account that the market data characterizes a trading environment that prevailed over either 12 or 28 months, whereas the fund valuations are snapshots at specific points in time. Nevertheless, the available evidence suffices to derive two important insights. Firstly, we find substantial differences in the funds’ portfolio values, although many of them exhibit the same or at least very similar average policyholder ages. Consider, for example, Funds 7 and 11, which both fall into the age bracket of 81–82 years, but value their assets at 29% and 80% of face value, respectively. Secondly, the latest valuation of certain fund portfolios does not seem to be in line with the average price levels that prevailed in the secondary and tertiary markets throughout recent years. While Funds 1, 5, and 9 exhibit

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14 With regard to the 12-month period, data for the tail segments (below 75 and above 86 years) was unavailable.

15 The higher prices in age brackets 71–72 and 73–74 can be attributed to an on average more severe health impairment of the insured persons (AAP, 2013a).
reasonable figures with regard to their age brackets, all others maintain valuations that are at least twice as high as one would expect based on the current market environment. While the portfolio valuations of between 26% and 29% of face value reported by Funds 2, 7, 8, and 10 might still be somewhat justifiable, those of Funds 3 and 4 (44% and 45%) as well as of Funds 6 and 11 (69% and 80%) are inconsistent with the observed market prices.

3.4 Potential Reasons for the Observed Deviations

First of all, the observed discrepancies between portfolio and market values could be caused by different pricing models. As mentioned in Section 2.4, the majority of market participants nowadays use the probabilistic approach, implying that it also governs our benchmark figures from the AAP Life Settlement Market Review. Thus, the fact that Fund 6 is known to still employ a deterministic valuation model may at least partly explain the deviation of its portfolio value from the current price levels of comparable transactions.

Figure 4: Premium Levels for Different Age Brackets

In addition, from Equation (1) we know that lower premium payments are associated with higher policy values. One might therefore suspect that those funds with relatively high portfolio values tend to invest in policies that exhibit below-average premiums. To further pursue this possibility we turn to Figure 4, in which we have plotted the quartile means per age bracket of the average annual premiums (in percent of face amount). The figures are based on all secondary and tertiary market trades in the AAP database with male policyholders that have been conducted in 2011 (AAP, 2013d).\footnote{We have constructed Figure 4 as follows. Firstly, the average annual premium in \% of face value for each policy in each age group has been calculated. Secondly, the policies for each age group have been sorted in ascending order according to their...} We notice that the differences between...
the premiums in the highest and lowest quartiles of the age groups below 90 years never exceed 5 percentage points. Therefore, premium streams alone are insufficient to explain the vast differences between portfolio and market values that have been observed in the previous section.

Next we consider the impact of LE estimates. From Equation (1) we know that the value of a life settlement rises for shorter LEs (higher mortality rates). Thus, it could be argued that the portfolio values of certain funds exceed current market levels simply because they mainly hold policies of insured individuals with above-average health impairments. In Figure 7, we have depicted the funds’ average LEs in months (vertical axis), staggered by the average age of the insureds in their portfolio (horizontal axis). Again each fund is represented by a red dot. Additionally, the corresponding levels of medical underwriting in the market are shown by the blue (average of the LE estimates from AVS), green (average of the LE estimates from 21st Services), and red lines (average of the LEs used to close transactions). The fact that the red curve is located between the green and blue curves indicates that a majority of deals rely on an LE that blends the estimates of the two largest US medical underwriters.

**Figure 5: Comparison of Fund LEs and Medical Underwriting in the Market**

At first glance, we notice that the LE estimates of AVS are almost always higher than those of 21st Services. It is clear that not both levels can be correct. In fact, the dispersion of individual LEs in the market around the mean for each age group is even wider (see Table 3).
Due to this considerable variation, funds enjoy a large amount of discretion, even when relying on a market-driven LE input for their valuation models. Under certain circumstances, it could, for example, still be justifiable to price a policy of a person aged 81 with an LE of 64 months instead of employing the market average of 90 months.

Table 3: Average LE (in Months) of Fund versus Medical Underwriting in the Market
(May 2012 – April 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Av. Age</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. LE used by Fund</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. LE at Closing</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. LE at Closing</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. LE at Closing</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Against this background, the LEs reported by Funds 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 are more or less reconcilable with the latest transactional data. Nevertheless, Funds 3, 4, 6, and 11 exhibit average LEs that lie well below the current market levels in their respective age brackets. More specifically, in all four cases the differences to the average LEs used for the closing of recent deals equal at least 20 months. The intuitive meaning can be illustrated with a simple example: the average LE at closing in the age group of 85-year-olds implies that 500 of 1000 individuals are expected to pass away within 70 months. In contrast, Fund 6 assumes that the same 500 individuals will have already died after a mere 20 months (see Table 3).

It certainly has to be taken into account that there are reasons due to which the average LE of a portfolio can diverge from the average LEs that prevail in the market, even if both policy mixes exhibit the same average age. On the one hand, the health status of individuals with an identical age may differ. Senior life settlements, however, do not comprise policies of terminally ill policyholders. Consequently, the corresponding impact on the funds’ valuations cannot be extreme unless a portfolio almost exclusively consists of insureds with severe health impairments, which is rather unlikely. Secondly, various portfolio structures (in terms of age distribution) may be associated with the same average age but different average LEs. Fortunately, a few simple numerical examples are sufficient to demonstrate that this effect can hardly explain discrepancies of 50 months, such as the one between the portfolio LE of Fund 6 and the corresponding average LE used for closing (see Table 3). Taking these considerations into account, it is likely that the extraordinarily high portfolio valuations of Funds 3, 4, 6, and 11 as documented in Figure 3 are attributable to the use of inade-

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17 Those numerical examples are available from the authors upon request.
quately short LEs. In other words, the managers seem to have alarmingly overvalued their life settlement assets.

To further underline this argument, the accuracy of the LE information provided by Fund 6 is assessed based on the A/E ratio for the two years between February 2011 and February 2013. For this purpose, we draw on additional information that has been published by Fund 6 in its February 2011 fact sheet and proceed as follows: in a first step, the relevant amount of actual death benefits collected is determined by subtracting inflows that occurred before February 2011 from the total amount of payments received up to February 2013 as reported in our survey. Apart from that, we calculate the expected death benefit payments for the period under consideration using a portfolio LE of 23 months and a total face value of USD 1,705 million (both figures from February 2011). If the fund’s LE estimate had been correct, 50% of the policies would have matured within less than two years. Assuming a roughly equal distribution of face values in the portfolio, this means that around USD 753 million in death benefits should have been paid out up until February 2013. In fact, however, only USD 270 million was disbursed, implying a gap between expected and actual payments of around USD 480 million or an A/E ratio of only 36%. For this to be plausible, face values would need to be very unevenly distributed across policies and almost exclusively those insureds with small death benefits should have passed away first. Both conditions are highly unlikely to hold. Hence, the A/E ratio is another indication for a severe underestimation of the LE and, in turn, a sizeable exaggeration of the portfolio value.

There are mainly three potential explanations for the low portfolio LEs and, in turn, A/E ratios. First of all, fund managers may price policies with an LE that is too short right at the outset, implying that they overpay for the life settlement asset upon purchase. Without market-consistent portfolio valuations there is obviously no strong incentive to buy at fair prices. Apart from that, it is a well-known fact in the life settlement industry that medical underwriting was overly aggressive in the past and had to be revised several times. Consequently, if an asset manager did not adjust his LE estimates after such market-wide shifts, they will be inadequately small today. Finally, the health status of insureds is often subject to unexpected changes over time, which can only be detected through regular reunderwriting. To save the associated costs and effort, some funds may decide to shorten LE figures based on their own judgment. Whether deliberate or not, if these LE reductions are too large, the life settlement assets will appreciate much more strongly than actually justified.

Finally, the inflated portfolio values of Funds 2, 7, 8, and 10 cannot be explained by inappropriate LE estimates (see Figure 7). Therefore, they must be attributable to the last dis-

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18 Based on such a short portfolio LE, one would expect that the health of a large number of individuals is severely impaired.
19 The first LE shift occurred in fall 2008. The last significant prolongation was announced by 21st Services in January 2013.
cretionary value driver included in Equation (1): the discount rate. To put it differently, the four above-mentioned funds do not seem to draw on market-consistent IRRs. The discount rate can be considered as the actual transmission belt between current transactions and fair portfolio values. If it has been adopted from another asset class (e.g. fixed income securities), it is clearly not risk-adequate for life settlements. Apart from that, it needs to be continuously adjusted in line with changes in market prices. Otherwise the book value of a fund’s policy will simply mirror the conditions at the time of its purchase, which, however, may no longer be realizable. These issues can be well illustrated for Fund 7. Despite a market-consistent average LE of 92 months (average age: 81 years), its relative valuation (28.7% of face value) equals roughly double the current market price level. This is because the manager values its portfolio with a discount rate of 12%, while the average IRR associated with the LEs used to close recent transactions in the same age bracket (81 years) amounts to 22.6% (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>78</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>81</th>
<th>82</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>84</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>86</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avg. (%)</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. (%)</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. (%)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, the observed exaggerations in the portfolio values of the majority of life settlement funds in our sample can be attributed to LE estimates and discount rates that are not in line with the observable price levels of current transactions. In contrast, Funds 1, 5, and 9 show reasonable valuations because they apply both market-consistent LEs and IRRs.

### 3.4 Limitations of the Analysis

Due to a number of limitations, it is important to consider our empirical results with caution. Although the employed market data represents a substantial and representative part of the life settlement industry, a certain number of transactions are not included. Furthermore, irrespective of the fact that it has been cross-checked with public sources wherever possible, the fund information used in our analysis is essentially self-reported. Another data-related drawback is the lack of granularity, which obstructs a more detailed analysis at policy instead of fund level. As discussed in the previous section, there are circumstances under which two portfolio compositions may exhibit similar average ages but different LEs. It should therefore be taken into account that the mix of policies bought by a fund may differ
from the one recently transferred in the life settlement market both in terms of health impairments and age distribution. The larger the respective deviations, the lower will be the comparability based on average figures.

Furthermore, there are market-related limitations. Some of the observed transactions may arise from distressed situations. In general, life settlements are held to maturity. Consequently, funds that sell policies in the tertiary market tend to be experiencing liquidity issues. Under such circumstances, considerable discounts may arise and lead to lower reported market prices. According to Conning (2012), this was indeed a characteristic of the tertiary market in recent years. Based on the data published by AAP, however, we do not find substantial differences between secondary and tertiary market transactions. Nevertheless, if a life settlement fund ramped up its portfolio during a calm period while the current market environment is dominated by distressed trades, a higher valuation may be somewhat more plausible. Finally, fund managers may invest in synthetic instruments or derivatives from investment banks through which they can gain longevity risk exposure without holding actual policies. In such cases, they might be willing to accept a surcharge on the current market prices, since their transaction and origination costs are considerably lower.

4. Implications and Suggestions for Improvement

4.1 Consequences of Mispriced Assets

Our empirical results indicate that a number of life settlement funds exploit the leeway inherent in the current accounting guidelines to overvalue their assets. This has several important implications for market participants. First, investors must expect to be treated unequally. This is illustrated by the following example: someone redeeming shares in Fund 3 was eligible to receive 45 cents per US dollar of face amount in March 2013 (see Figure 3). However, if the fund management had been forced to liquidate its portfolio immediately afterward, it would have had difficulty in recovering much more than 12 cents per US dollar of face value for the remaining investors. Next, fund managers and third parties who are remunerated based on the assets under management earn more than they should. Similarly, when life settlement portfolio valuations are decoupled from actual market prices, it is possible to reap illegitimate up-front profits by overpaying for deals or to artificially appreciate assets and collect performance fees based on phantom gains. Thus, the prevailing fee arrangements in the life settlement industry provide a clear incentive to inflate portfolio values. Lastly, to avoid liquidity issues, funds with tremendously overvalued assets will be forced to halt redemptions if those exceed new subscriptions for a certain amount of time. The reason is that they cannot simply sell policies for the values reported in their financial statements.
4.2 Suggestions for Improvement

Based on the prevailing accounting guidelines for life settlements as well as our empirical findings, three major areas for improvement can be identified: (i) the classification of life settlement assets in the fair value hierarchy of IFRS 13, (ii) the disclosure of information used for portfolio valuation, and (iii) the development of incentive-compatible fee structures.

Since IFRS 13 has come into effect in January 2013, i.e., after the due dates of some of the fund valuations in our dataset, it might already have exerted an impact on the valuation practices in the industry that we were not able to document yet. Nevertheless, the categorization as level 3 assets in the fair value hierarchy still grants managers considerable discretion with regard to the choice of input factors. Accordingly, to promote a more objective and transparent valuation approach, we suggest reclassifying life settlements as level 2 assets in the fair value hierarchy. Although market prices for identical policies in terms of age, LE, death benefit, premiums, etc. are hard to observe, it is possible to link up valuations with comparable transactions analogously to the mortgage or real estate markets.20 To avoid further conflicts of interest, however, one would need to ensure that the market-consistent inputs come from independent third-party data providers instead of life settlement firms or the funds' own records. Thereby, one could increase the comparability and transparency of valuations and reduce the dependence on subjective assumptions.

In addition, fund managers currently have an incentive to drastically shorten LEs over time in order to achieve a steep appreciation of the portfolio after the purchase. This issue could be mitigated through improved disclosure requirements for the life settlement industry. In particular, funds should be obliged to report LE figures, discount rates, actual death rates, and A/E ratios for their portfolios on a regular basis. The consequence would be a healthy degree of market discipline since, based on this information, investors, actuarial advisers, custodian banks, and auditors could easily verify the portfolio values reported by the funds. Moreover, if certain medical underwriters refuse the publication of their A/E figures, managers should be required to inform their investors about this fact. As a corollary, it would become much more difficult to employ inconsistently low LE estimates and discount rates, and products that rely on intransparent medical underwriting will become hard to sell.

Regarding the issue that today’s fee structures incentivize asset managers to manipulate portfolio valuations, it would be reasonable to use realized earnings such as death benefit payments instead of fund volume or NAV gains as a basis for compensation. Additionally, the transparency with regard to fee schedules and actual earnings of the fund managers should be improved to overcome inappropriate incentives.

20 In fact, it is very common to value real estate assets based on transaction prices for comparable properties.
5. Summary and Conclusion

We analyzed the prevailing valuation practices in the life settlement industry based on a sample of 11 funds that cover a large portion of the current market. The most striking result is that a majority of asset managers seem to substantially overvalue their portfolios relative to the prices of comparable transactions that have recently been closed. Drawing on market-consistent estimates with regard to medical underwriting, it is possible to trace back the observed discrepancies to inadequately low model inputs for LEs and discount rates. The main consequences are a dissimilar treatment of investor groups in open-end fund structures as well as an unduly high compensation for managers and third parties. To address this predicament, we suggest defining life settlements as level 2 assets in the fair value hierarchy of IFRS 13, improving transparency and disclosure requirements, and developing new incentive-compatible fee arrangements.

Market-consistent valuation by means of comparable transactions is already established for other illiquid and nonstandardised assets such as real estate. We believe our findings demonstrate that, due to the emergence of reliable data providers in recent years, it is now also feasible for life settlements. Against this background and taking into account that a number of fraud schemes have partly eroded investor trust in the industry, regulators, auditors, advisers, and, in particular, fund managers should consider a radical change in valuation practices. It is hard to imagine the long-term persistence and potential further growth of the life settlement asset class in the absence of honest attempts to estimate fair values of policies and portfolios.
References


Appendix

General Information
- Fund volume in US Dollars
- Cash/liquidity in US Dollars
- Outstanding amount of a credit line in US Dollars
- Most recent offering memorandum
- Most recent annual report or interim report

Life Settlement Portfolio
- Sum face amount in US Dollars
- Cash surrender value expressed in percent of face value
- Book value of portfolio in US Dollars
- Number of policies/lives
- Average age in years
- Average current LE in months
- Gender split (male/female/joint)
- Used medical underwriting (21st Services, AVS, etc.; blended 21st/AVS, etc.)
- Description of the valuation method used - On what accounting standards (e.g. IFRS 13, FASB ASC 820-10, etc.) is the valuation based?

(Unless indicated otherwise, all information is as at the end of March 2013.)